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one of contraception,32 but one of conception and the paramount right
to life that attaches thereto.
As early as 1949, the Virginia Supreme Court viewed anti-abortion
legislation in this perspective: "Anti-abortion statutes are enacted,
not only for protection of the woman, but for protection of the
unborn child and society . . ."33 However intimidating the population
bomb may become, however deafening the public clamor for open
abortion,34 the courts cannot properly abandon the fetus to the whim
of circumstances-even in the first three months of gestation. Reason,
not rationalization, must be the guardian of human life.
William T. Robinson III
UNnom C omccA.L CoDE-AssiGNmENTs-CoNDoroNAL SAims CoN-
TRAcrs-WAivEa OF DEFENSE CAusE.-O. G. Jennings purchased a car
from an automobile dealer under a conditional sales contract which
embodied a "waiver of defense or counterclaim" clause.1 The contract
received the customary treatment of such agreements, assignment to
a finance company. Apparently upon default of payments, the as-
signee repossessed and sold the car, bringing suit against Jennings to
recover the deficiency on the unpaid balance. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the assignee, disallowing a counterclaim that
the retailer had delivered a used car misrepresented as a new one.
2
3 2 Lucas, supra note 21.
33 Miller v. Bennet, 190 Va. 162 -. 56 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1949).
34 The trend of public opinion is clear:
Whatever the underlying motivation, public attitudes about abortion
have changed ra idly. In 1967, a Gallup poll showed that 21 percent of
Americans felt abortion should be permitted for any woman wanting
one. In a Gallup study last year, four out of ten persons said they re-
garded abortion as a private matter between a woman and her doctor.
Abortion and the Changing Law, NEwswEE, April 13, 1970, at 54.
1 It is standard procedure for car dealers to include "waiver" clauses in condi-
tional sales contracts. To obtain enough ready cash to restore inventory, dealers
assign (sell) their right to collect under a sales contract to financial institutions at
a discount. The following clause was embodied in the sales contract of the in-
stant case: I
If Seller assigns this contract, Seller shall not be assignee's agent for
transmission of payments or for any purpose; Customer will settle, directly
with Seller, all claims, defenses, set-offs and counterclaims there may
be against Seller, and not set up any thereof against assignee. Upon
full payment of Customer's obligation, assignee may deliver all original
papers, including any certificate of title to Seller as Customer's agent.
442 S.W.2d at 566.
2 The effect of the UmurOmi Co m.ciAL CoDE [hereinafter UCC in the
footnotes] § 9-206(1), which provides for the use of "waiver" clauses, is to make
the assignee of the contract the holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.
As such, he is free from certain "personal" defenses such as a failure of consi-
deration. Receiving a used rather than a new car is a failure of consideration.
See UCC § 3-305.
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Jennings appealed. Held: The "waiver of defense" clause is consistent
with Article 9-206(1) of the Kentucky Commercial Code and not
contrary to public policy.3 Jennings v. Universal C.I.T., Credit Corpora-
tion, 442 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).
Contractual waiver of defense has been a troublesome area of law
throughout much of the twentieth century, primarily because of the
continuing growth in credit purchases. 4 The problem has two justifiable
points of view, much like the proverbial coin. In order to obtain enough
ready cash to restore inventory, honest businessmen need sales con-
tracts which are readily assignable. If the contract contains a waiver
clause immunizing the assignee from lawsuits over performance of the
contract, it is more easily assignable and therefore more valuable.
Posed against this commercial advantage is the necessity of giving
some protection to the consumer,5 who has little bargaining power over
clauses in standard form contracts, 6 but who will ultimately suffer by
waiving all personal defenses against the assignee. The rather severe
consequences that flow directly from the waiver clause may be sum-
marized as: (1) placing on the buyer the risk of the seller's possible
insolvency because the buyer must pay the assignee regardless of per-
formance; (2) putting the burden on the buyer to locate the seller
and bring suit against him; and (3) depriving the buyer of the pos-
sibility that by refusing to make payments on defective goods, he could
force the seller to comply with the terms of the contract. From the
vantage point of creating respect for the law, the problem is further
magnified when the consumer simply cannot comprehend that he
could be required to pay the finance company when a fly-by-night
dealer has not delivered his color TV, or has become insolvent before
delivery.
7
3 Although beyond the scope of this comment, the case was actually reversed
and a new hearing granted on a procedural point. Summary judgment should not
have been granted because an issue was successfully raised as to whether there
was a default in payments to justify repossession.
4 The Federal Reserve Board reported the increase in installment credit, to
the end of February, 1969, at 89.4 billion dollars. Total consumer credit was
111.6 billion dollars. This latter figure includes loans to individuals for household
and family expenses, excluding real estate mortgage loans. 55 FE. REsEnvE BuLL.
A52 (April 1969).
5 In the broad sense, every buyer is a consumer. But it has been the practice
to differentiate buyers who utilize the goods for business purposes from buyers of
more personalized items. UCC § 9-109 specifies that goods are "consumer goods"
if they are bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
These are separated in treatment from equipment, farm products and inventory.
6 Freedom of contract is beneficial to all when it exists in truth. However, in
the field of consumer goods, as in the labor market, this is more fancy than fact.
Hollander, Consumer Perspective and Consumer Sales Under the U.C.C., 21
N.Y.U. I-nuA. L. REv. 241 (1966).
7 Jones, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices, 1968 Wis. L.
Rev. 505, 525-26 (1968). Cf. Note, Can The Kentucky Consumer Ever Forget
Caveat Emptor and Find True Happiness?, 58 Ky. L. J. 325, 336-47 (1970).
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There is real difficulty in determining from the early decisions
majority and minority views with regard to the rights and duties of the
assignees of conditional sales contracts.8 Without regard to the dif-
ference between consumer and commercial sales, a few courts out-
lawed all waiver clauses as an affront to public policy.9 Others reached
an opposite result by relying on theories of laissez-faire.10 Today many
states, recognizing waiver clauses in general, have enacted laws
especially dealing with consumer problems. These may completely
void contractual waiver of defenses as out of place in the consumer
field." A more creditor-oriented approach has been to provide for
notice of assignment to the buyer, and for a delayed period before the
clause can become effective. 2 This provides the consumer with only a
limited opportunity to notify the assignee of defects in the goods and
preserve his defenses. The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code
[hereinafter U3C], thus far enacted in only two states,13 substantially
provides for either of the above methods that the adopting state might
prefer.1
4
8 Note, Finance Company As A Holder In Due Course, 51 Ky. L. J. 134, 139-
40 (1982).
9 Equipment Accept. Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th Cir.
1941); San Francisco Sec. Corp. v. Phoenix Motor Co., 25 Ariz. 531, 220 P. 229
(1923); American Nat'l Bank v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc., 191 Cal. 364, 216 P.
376 (1923); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 285 (1958);
Industrial Loan Co. v. Grisham, 115 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App. 1938); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 Misc. 375 213 N.Y.S. 536 (Sup. Ct. 1926J, aff'd mem.,
219 App. Div. 771, 220 N.Y.S. 893 (1 Dept. 1927), aff'd mem., 247 N.Y. 538, 161
N.E. 173 (1928); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgan, 162 Wash. 449, 298
P. 705 (1931).
10 United States ex rel. Adm'r v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1940); Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Haskew, 194 Ark. 549, 108 S.W.2d 908
(1937); Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Clark Barone Co., 21 Conn. Sup. 368,
154 A.2d 883 (1959); Jones v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. A pp. 24, 75
S.E.2d 822 (1953); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Baigi 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136
N.E.2d 580 (1956); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Biee, 147 W. Va. 786, 131
S.E.2d 745 (1963). See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 895 (1957).
11ALAs. STAT. § 42.10.140 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (West Supp.
1967); HAWAn REV. LAWS § 201A-17(d) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,
§§ 615 (F), (G) (Purdon 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1967);
WASH. RE:V. CODE ANN. § 63.14.150 (Supp. 1967).
12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 4312 (Supp. 1966) (15 day delay period); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121- , § 262D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (5 day delay period);
MicOH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 445.865(d) (1967) (15 day delay eriod); N.Y.
PEns. Thop. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney Supp. 1967) (10 day elay period);
TEXAS Ev. cv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.07, -7.08 (Vernon Supp. 1967) (30 day
delay period).
13 To date only Utah and Oklahoma have adopted the UCCC, For a full
discussion of the Oklahoma law see Comment, Consumer Credit Sales and the
Oklahoma Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 6 TULSA L. J. 20 (1969).
14 See Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and the UCC-Limitations on Creditors"
Agreements and Practices, 33 LAW & CoNTEmP. Pnon. 686 (1968). For a short
summary see Murphy, Another Assault Upon The Citadel: Limiting The Use of
Negotiable Notes and Waiver Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L. J. 667
(1968). See Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter U3C] § 2.404 (Alterna-
(Continued on next page)
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In states like Kentucky, reluctant to adopt progressive consumer
legislation, the whole problem is relegated to the more general pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the Code]. The
1952 draft of the Code took a strong position in favor of the con-
sumer.15 It prohibited the assignee from cutting off the buyer's defenses
either by use of a waiver clause in the assigned contract, or as a holder
in due course of a negotiable note.10 The 1957 revision of the Code,
adopted in Kentucky,17 modified its position so as to permit waiver
clauses, but with a controversial limitation where consumer goods were
involved. Code Section 9-206 now provides:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a
a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any
claim or defense which he may have against the seller or lessor is
enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in
good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to
defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial
Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs
both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such
an agreement. (2) When a seller retains a purchase money security
interest in goods the Article on Sales (Article 2) governs the sale
and any disclaimer, limitation or modification of the seller's war-
ranties.' 8 (emphasis added)
A literal reading of Code Section 9-206(1) might suggest that a
waiver clause is to be effective as to consumer goods, unless there is
a prior statute or decision to the contrary. A number of text writers
and at least one court have accepted this construction. 9 The Code,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tive A and Alternative B). For a comparative critique of these USC Alternatives
see Note, Can The Kentucky Consumer Ever Forget Caveat Emptor and Find
True Happiness, 58 Ky. L. J. 325, 358-60 n. 194 (1970).
15 See, e.g., Spivock, In Re Article 9, 28 Txmvn. L. Q. 603 (1955); Annot., 44
A.L.R.2d 162 (1955).
16 UCC 9-206(1) (1952 version) provides:
An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract for
sale that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense arising
out of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If such buyer as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement even a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument is
subject to such claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce the security
interest either by proceeding under the security agreement or by attach-
ing or levying upon the goods in an action upon the instrument.
17 The UCC as enacted in Kentucky can be found in Ky. REv. STAT. [here-
inafter KRS] § 855.1-101-10-104 (1968).
18 UCC § 9-206 and KRS § 355.9-206 are the same.
19 See 15 Am. Jxm.2d Commercial Code § 58 (1964); Comment, Assignments-
Maker's Defense Cut Off-Uniform Commercial Code § 9-206, 5 NAT. REsouRcEs
J. 408 (1965). The problem also came up in General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Noblett, 268 F.Supp. 984, 986-87 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
1970]
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however, has an inherent ambiguity which has created confusion and
is likely to result in less than uniformity of decision.
The drafter's official comment to Section 9-206(1) implies that the
provision in the preambular clause for the superiority of a statute or
decision to the contrary does not require that either be prior to the
Code. Rather it is the drafter's way of having the Code take "no
position on the controversial question" of the validity of waiver clauses
in consumer sales.20 That comment states:
This article takes no position on the controversial question whether
a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive defenses by
contractual clause or by execution of a negotiable note. In some
states such waivers have been invalidated by statute. In other
states the course of judicial decision has rendered them in-
effective or unreliable-courts have found that the assignee is not
protected against the buyer's defense by a clause in the contract
or that the holder of a note, by reason of too close connection
with the underlying transaction, does not have the rights of a
holder in due course. This Article neither adopts or rejects the
approach taken in such statutes and decisions, except that the
validation of waivers in subsection (1) is expressly made "sub-
ject to any statute or decision" which may restrict the waivefs
effectiveness in the case of a buyer of consumer good. (emphasis
added)
The Legislative Research Commission of Kentucky, in a study autho-
rized by the General Assembly pursuant to the adoption of Code, ap-
parently accepted the drafters' comment as the authoritative interpreta-




New Jersey implicity followed this approach when, there being
no prior statute or decision to the contrary, its highest court declared
in Unico v. Owen22 that such waivers are unconscionable and against
public policy. Section 2-802 of the Code authorizes courts to refuse to
enforce any clause that they find unconscionable. Reading that
section together with the comment to Section 9-206(1), the New
Jersey court concluded this situation to be one of the rare instances
where the legislature sanctions a broad judicial discretion. The Unico
decision has been called the possible future trend in interpreting that
facet of the Code.
23
Before Jennings, Kentucky had not been squarely faced with the
consumer problem arising under Section 9-206(1). Strangely, the
2o UCC § 9.206, comment 2.
21 Ky. LEGISLATIVE RES-ARCH CovnM., UNIFORM COMMlVsRCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS
OF ErFECTs ON ExIsTING KENTucKY LAW, RESEARCH PuB. No. 49, p.355 (1957).
2250 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).23 Jones, supra note 7, at 517. See U3C 2.404, Comment 1.
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Court's opinion does not differentiate between consumer and com-
mercial sales, a distinction vital to a proper disposition of the problem
involved. Nonetheless, it is clear Jennings partially grounded his
defense on the allegation that since this vehicle was to be used for
personal needs, the Code should void the waiver.2 4 Without much dis-
cussion, the Court relied on prior Kentucky decisions under Section
9-206(1).25 However, these cases all dealt with some form of equip-
ment which the Code distinguishes from consumer goods.26 Yet they
do clearly indicate that no established public policy favors the con-
sumer. In Walter J. Hieb Sand and Gravel, Incorporated v. Universal
C.I.T., Credit Corporation, a pre-Code case cited in Jennings, the Court
noted two statutes which seemingly demonstrated the validity of con-
tractual waivers without regard to the type of transaction.21 In passing,
the Hieb court also examined the Massachusetts public policy against
waiver clauses and found no counterpart in Kentucky.2 8 The remaining
cases cited in Jennings purport to follow Hieb.
Complete reliance on these cases could only indicate a predisposi-
tion toward a literal interpretation of Section 9-206(1) oblivious to
the drafter's construction. Since the court found no statute or decision
to the contrary it declined to create one, and the waiver clause in
Jennings' contract was held to be effective.
Considering the legislative history of the Kentucky Code noted
above, the case could have been decided differently.2 9 But from the
standpoint of sociological jurisprudence, the inquiry as to whether it
should have been still remains. It is true that little harm results from
24 Brief for Appellant at 9, Jennings v. Universal C.I.T., Credit Corp., 442
S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).2 5 Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969); Root v. John
Deere Co., 413 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1967); Morgan v. John Deere Co., 394 S.W.2d
453 (Ky. 1965); W. J. Hieb Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T., Credit
Corp., 332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1959).
26 Subjects of commerce found in the few Kentucky cases decided under KRS
355.9-206(1) may include the following: (1) dump beds for trucks used in busi-
ness (2) tractors and other farm machinery (3) plant machinery.
27332 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1956). This case was decided after the adoption
of the UCC but before its effective date. It held that KRS § 371.040 demonstrated
a statutory policy which would uphold waiver clauses. That provision provides
as follows:
All bonds, bills or notes for money or property are assignable so as to
vest the right of action in the assignee; but, except in the case of negoti-
able instruments, the assignment shall not impair the right to any de-
fense, discount or set-off that the defendant has and might have used
against the original obligee, or any intermediate assignor, before the de-
fendant received notice of the assignment.
The Court also held that the UNiFoam SALEs AcT (formerly KRS § 361.710),
which existed in Kentucky prior to the UCC, allowed agreed variations of implied
obligations usually incident to sales. 332 S.W.2d at 621-22.
28 332 S.W.2d at 621.
29 See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
19701
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a recognition of contractual waiver when personal defenses may be cut
off by a merchant taking a negotiable note and assigning it to a finance
company who becomes a holder in due course. But this begs the
question, which is whether any legal device should exist which cuts
off the consumer's resort to the courts and prohibits thereby a redress
of real grievances. Indeed, an increasing number of states, either by
statute or common law, are beginning to deny holder in due course
status in consumer sales. 30
The most potent argument against invalidating the waiver clauses
comes from the nature of the finance industry itself. The only way
many consumers can afford to purchase goods is by taking advantage
of credit. If financial institutions are unwilling to discount conditional
sales contracts without immunity from suits over the merchant's per-
formance, then arguably it will be the consumer who suffers.3 ' A more
likely result seems to be that financing institutions would be forced
to inquire more carefully into the integrity and capital structure of
the merchants with whom they deal, just as they check credit ratings
before making personal loans.32 In a 1968 survey of Springfield, Mas-
sachusetts, where waiver clauses have long been considered against
public policy, over 55% of responding financial institutions noticed no
effect on their business as a result of this pro-consumer policy.3 3 The
study did point out, however, a slight shift from contract assignments
to direct consumer loans. But here, at least, the buyer is more likely
to realize that he must repay the loan, even if the goods are defective.
When he procures credit through the merchant, the finance company
appears as an agent of the seller.
On balance, the equities appear to be more on the side of the
consumer. Even if the waiver clause does not appear hidden in fine
print, the buyer will usually not understand its full impact. Nor is he
able to bargain over its inclusion. If one doubts that real confusion
exists in trying to understand the legal implications of installment buy-
ing, he need only notice the increasing number of consumer bank-
ruptcies.34 Further, litigation can be an expensive process when you
must pay the assignee, search for an absconded salesman, and then
sue the merchant on the contract. The financial institutions, who
3 0 By statute: MASS. GEr. LAws ANN. ch. 225, § 12(c) (Supp. 1966); NEv.
RFv. STAT. § 97.275 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50.16.5 (Supp. 1967); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 83.650 (1968); PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 69, § 615 (F), (G) (Purdon
1965). At common law: Unico v. Owen 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
31 Comment, Waiver of Defense Clauses and Consumer Protection In Install-
ment Sales Contracts, 36 FoRDmHm L. REv. 106, 107 (1967).32 King, The Unprotected Consumer-Maker Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 DicK. L. REv. 207, 211-13 (1961).3 3 Jones, supra note 7, at 524-25.
34 113 CoNG. REc. 7520 (daily ed. May 31, 1967).
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usually are closely connected with this seller, are better able to bear
the risk of the seller's non-performance. In addition, they can shift
the burden of non-performance to its creator, the seller, by discounting
with right of recourse against the merchant or by holding some dis-
count proceeds in a reserve fund to cover off-sets arising from the
buyer's defenses.
3 5
Undoubtedly, as Jennings indicates, we should have a clearer
mandate from the General Assembly on consumer policy. Yet, the New
Jersey court did not feel constrained by the language of the Code to
throw the woolsack to the legislature.3 6 Clearly, basic equity, as em-
bodied in the Code's term "unconscionable," would require a con-
struction of Section 9-206(1) the converse of that adopted in Jennings.
Jack M. Smith
3 5 Bailey, The Substantive Provisions of the UCCO: 20th Century Con-
sumer Protection in a Free Enterprise System, 29 OMao ST. L. J. 597, 618 n.189
(1968).
36 See text accompanying notes 22 and 23 supra.
